Introduction
In 1995, the African National Congress (ANC) took power in South Africa after a long struggle against apartheid. In March 1996, the South African Ministry of Finance announced its budget, which lay the basis for a five-year programme announced in June of that year, the Growth, Employ ment and Redistribution programme (the so-called GEAR (1997) , and is discussed in Section 4, below.
2 A survey of the debate is found in Michie and Padayachee ( 1997; see also Fine and Padayachee, 1998) . In their introduction to the book, the editors place emphasis upon the constraints to economic policy resulting from the nature of the political settlement that facilitated majority rule: 'We would argue that in the process of negotiations, certain concessions were made by the ANC in respect of economic issues which, however important they may have been to the political settlement, did serve to blunt the movement's economic weapons [and] close down certain policy options ' (Michie and Padayachee, 1997, p. 11 African has a decent living standard and economic security' (RDP, 1994, p. 20) . In
February 1996, the GEAR confirmed the first goal, stressing the need for 'a competitive economy which creates sufficient jobs for all workseekers ' (GEAR, 1996) . The GEAR document set the specific targets of 6% growth of GDP by 2000 and annual job creation of 400,000. incomes ', RDP, 1996, p. 8) .1 A careful reading of the GEAR suggests that its recom
1 The GEAR'S policy framework showed striking similiarities to that propounded in a report issued by the South African white business community, Growth for All (South Africa Foundation, 1996) . The similarity is pointed outbyNattrass (1997) , and by Michie and Padayachee (1998, p. 627 The GEAR document organised its policy proposals around two sets of projections for 1996-2000, the 'base scenario' and the 'integrated scenario'. The former was described as that associated with the performance of the economy under the policy framework prevailing in mid-1996, and the latter as the outcome if a number of policies were changed ('reforms'). The most important policy changes were increased public-sector investment, faster deficit reduction and more rapid tariff liberalisation. The document maintained that these policy changes would result in an increase in the average GDP growth rate for the five years, as well as an increase in export growth.
Perhaps the most important issue for analysing the likely success of the GEAR was whether the programmed rate of growth was consistent in terms of aggregate demand and supply.
In the abstract, the total output of a country is determined by its productive capacity, and the maximum growth rate of output is determined by the rate of increase of that capacity. The degree to which the capacity is utilised is determined by the effective (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) Note: The demand stimuli in the last column are based upon the national income accounting identity,
where C is household consumption, I^ is private investment, 1^ is public sector investment, G is government 'consumption', and X" (X -AT) is net exports. This converts into growth rates (in lower-case letters), assuming consumption a function of income and government expenditure a constant portion of GDP: (actual) 7-7 7-5 10-9 8-8
6. REER (change in) -8-5 -0-3 00 00 00
Notes: All indicators are to the end of the third quarter of 1998, except employment and real wages (second quarter); inflation and the real bank rate (include the first month of the fourth quarter). *The source describes this item as the 'bank rate'; however, it clearly refers to the real bank rate. Numbers in bold type indicate targets met or exceeded. Shaded boxes indicate periods in the future as of date of this paper.
Source-. GEAR, 1996; Reserve Bank of South Africa, Quarterly Bulletins and Website (updated March 1999).
1 Actual growth performance fell well short of pessimistic projections. Michie and Padayachee note that, in early 1997, growth for that year was 'expected at best to be 2-5%' (Michie and Padayachee, 1998, p. 631), instead of the GEAR target of 2 • 9 %. In the event, the rate proved to be 1 ■ 1 %.
2 Though the rate of inflation rose in the second half of the year. Africa's growth rate with that of middle-income 'newly-industrialising' countries (NICs).
In Figure 4 , the difference between South Africa's quarterly growth rate and the growth highly distorted real interest rates (see Figure 5 ).3
Shifting GEAR(s) for growth
Beginning in early 1996, the South African government embarked upon a macro economic policy that explicitly emphasised fiscal austerity: deficit reduction and pegging taxation and expenditure as fixed proportions of GDP. After this policy had run half its course (by. the end of the third quarter of 1998), the government could claim to have successfully reduced the fiscal deficit, and successfully brought inflation down to single 1 This means that the rate of time preference would be equal to the rate at which real consumption per head increases in the long run.
2 The real bank rate during 1996.Q3 to the end of 1998.Q2 averaged 8-8% (with private capital market rates substantially higher). If, as the GEAR proposed, the sustainable growth of GDP was about 5%, then sustainable per capita growth would be less than 3%.
3 Pillay provides a detailed analysis of monetary policy in the 1990s (Pillay, 1997). 
